This paper examines the effect of automatic grade promotion on academic achievement in 1,993 public primary schools in Brazil. A difference-in-differences approach that exploits variation over time and across schools in the grade promotion regime allows the identification of the treatment effect of automatic promotion. I find a negative and significant effect of about 7% of a standard deviation on math test scores. I provide evidence in support of the interpretation of the estimates as disincentive effect of automatic promotion. The findings contribute to the understanding of retention policies by focussing on the ex-ante effect of repetition and are important for more complete cost-benefit considerations of grade retention.
INTRODUCTION
Grade retention, the practice of holding back students in the same grade for an extra year if they fail to achieve promotion requirements -either in the form of a performance measure or in the form of minimum attendance -is used in many developing and in some developed countries. It is particularly widespread and pronounced in African and Latin American countries, where repetition rates are often as high as 30% (UNESCO 2008 Retaining students has important consequences both for the individual as well as for schools.
Overall, every repeater has the same effect on school resources as enrolling an additional student at that grade and subsequent grades and either leads to compromising per pupil school inputs e.g. through larger class size or to a pressure on public finances through the additional demand for teachers, classrooms, desks and other inputs.
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Opponents of grade repetition contend that it negatively impacts the retained individual by stigmatizing them and harming their self-esteem, by impairing established peer relationships and generally alienating the individual from school, which may in turn negatively affect academic achievement and increase the probability of dropping-out of school (Holmes 1989 ).
Furthermore, repeating grades delays entrance of students into the labour market which poses substantial monetary cost on students over the life-cycle. In contrast, proponents argue that repetition can improve academic achievement by exposing low performing students to additional teaching and by allowing them to catch up on the curriculum and the content of teaching. This is particularly important if school absence for reasons such as illness in a given school year is the reason for retention. Grade retention may also help to make classes more homogeneous in achievement and therefore easier to teach by improving the match between peers in the classroom (Manacorda 2012 ).
There is a small but growing literature on estimating the causal effect of retention on subsequent educational outcomes (Gomes-Neto and Hanushek 1994 , Eide and Showalter 2001 , Dong 2009 , Jacob and Lefgren 2004 , Manacorda 2012 and Glick and Sahn 2010 mixed, with positive as well as negative estimates of the effect of repetition on academic achievement and school drop-out, and the results seem to depend critically on context and age of students.
Considering these mixed empirical findings on the effect on repeaters, the use of public resources and the undesirable consequences for public finances, the persistence of grade retention regimes in many countries is puzzling. This is particularly the case for developing countries where repetition rates are often very high and pressure on public resources is large.
Furthermore, repetition increases the age variation in the classroom and repeaters may also directly lead to negative externalities on their peer students (Manski 1993, Lavy, Paserman and Schlosser 2012) .
A possible explanation for the persistence of grade retention in many countries may be based on the deterrence effect of grade retention. 4 Grade retention induces students to exert effort as it potentially inflicts substantial costs of repetition on low performers. The ex-ante threat of retention may therefore incentivize students to study in order to avoid being retained. This incentive effect of grade retention may have an important effect on mean student outcomes, as it is not restricted to repeaters only, but may create incentives for a much wider range of students.
While the empirical literature on grade retention focuses on the ex-post effect on repeaters, there exists -to the author's knowledge -no research on the ex-ante effect of the promotion regime on academic outcomes of a wider set of students. This analysis examines the effect of removing the deterrence of retention rather than estimating the effect of repetition on repeaters. Automatic grade promotion has been introduced in Brazil on a large scale since the early 2000's partly to accelerate progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education and to reducing the cost of larger student cohorts (UNESCO 2012). I exploit credible exogenous variation in the timing of the adoption of automatic promotion for identification in a difference-in-differences (DiD) setting.
I find that the introduction of automatic promotion significantly reduces academic achievement measured by math test scores of fourth graders by 6.7% of a standard deviation. Quantile DiD results show that the strongest treatment effect can be found for the lower part of the test score distribution with considerably smaller effects in the tails of the distribution. This is consistent with an interpretation of the estimates as a disincentive effect of automatic promotion and the paper provides additional evidence in support of this interpretation. There is no evidence that the results are caused by teacher responses to the introduction of automatic promotion. Teachers are no more or less likely to assign and correct their students' homework, and class size is unaffected by the policy introduction. Because there is only limited information on teaching practices available it is not possible to rule out completely the possibility of systematic teacher responses to the policy. The timing of the policy change limits the potential for changes in the student composition of the test cohorts and I provide strong evidence that the socio-economic composition is unaffected by the policy and unlikely biases the estimates. There is also no evidence that the estimates are affected by systematic changes in student mobility across schools or by strategic test taking behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on the school system in Brazil and in the state of Minas Gerais. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 describes the natural experiment and outlines the assignment of schools to treatment. Section 5 introduces the empirical strategy. The results, their interpretation and falsification exercises are presented in section 6, and section 7 concludes.
THE SCHOOL SYSTEM IN BRAZIL AND MINAS GERAIS
Primary school is compulsory in Brazil for children between the ages of 7 to 14 and consists of eight years of schooling (MEC 1996) . 5 Public schooling is free at all ages and enrolment in primary and secondary school is open to students of all ages.
The Brazilian educational system has undergone substantial changes during the last two decades and has achieved considerable progress in expanding access to education. Starting from a primary school net enrolment rate of 85% in 1991, Brazil achieves today almost universal primary school enrolment with a net rate of 95% (UNESCO 2008) . Primary school completion and youth literacy rates have improved notably, but the country continues to suffer from high repetition and drop-out rates.
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The national conditional cash transfer programme Bolsa Família, formerly Bolsa Escola, which is a means-tested monthly cash transfer to poor households conditional on school enrolment and regular attendance among other conditions, plays a significant role for the rise in school enrolment and attendance of school age children (de Janvry, Finan and Sadoulet 2006). The school entry age has been lowered recently to 6 years and primary school has been extended to 9 years. 6 The overall repetition rate in primary schools in Brazil in 2006 was 18.7% and the total drop-out rate for primary school 19.5% (UNESCO 2008 The Brazilian school census compiles data annually from all primary and secondary schools in
Brazil. The exceptionally rich data includes information on the location and administrative dependence of schools, physical characteristics (quantity of premises and class rooms, equipment and teaching material), the participation in national, state and municipal school programmes, the number of teachers and administrative staff, average class-size, detailed information on student flows (number of students in each grade by to age, repetition, drop-out and student transfer rates) among other information. Summary statistics for the public schools used in this analysis are presented in panel A of table A1 in the annex.
The school census also contains the information on the grade promotion regime of adopted in each school (grade retention versus automatic promotion), which is used to establish treatment and control groups. 8 The installation of FUNDEF, a federal fund established in 1996 with the aim of redistributing state and municipal resources back to (mainly) municipalities according to student numbers contributed to the improvement of the control of municipalities over educational decisions. (Pino and Koslinski 1999) . Section 3 of Art. 32 §1&2 formally distinguishes two alternatives for educational authorities to organize student progression:
besides the conventional annual grade promotion regime the option of automatic promotion was introduced, a system in which students progress automatically to the next grade at the end of the school year. Between these two extremes, a mixture of both regimes was also permitted. In the mixed regime, schools define "learning cycles" that stretch over several -most commonly three -school years. During the initial years of the cycle students are promoted automatically. In the 10 Schools under the administration of the municipality or the federal government are not included in SIMAVE.
final year of a cycle students that fail to meet the minimum requirements set in the curriculum are retained. The idea behind learning cycles is to allow students an individual studying pace (Mainardes 2010 Figure 1 shows the propensity score for the probability of treatment for the treatment and control group revealing substantial overlap in the multivariate distribution of covariates and a relatively similar pattern of the distribution of the propensity score for the treatment and control group.
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In addition, I estimate a linear probability model to determine whether there are systematic differences between schools that have adopted automatic promotion at different points in time.
The results are presented in table A6. The coefficients on the set of school characteristics are generally small and only very few are statistically significant. When including SRE controls even fewer variables show a significant effect and it is difficult to establish any systematic pattern.
Given the similarity of treatment and control schools with respect to school characteristics and the student composition, it is plausible to consider the assignment of schools to treatment and control groups as conditionally random.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
To estimate the treatment effect of the policy change I use a DiD estimator exploiting the variation in treatment status of schools over time, identifying an average treatment effect on individuals in schools assigned to treatment. The double difference approach is capable of removing biases resulting from permanent latent differences between treatment and control as well as biases resulting from common trends over time. The estimation in a regression setup allows including additional regressors on the individual and school level to improve precision and to test for the presence of omitted-school specific trends, in particular related to potential changes in the student composition. Identification requires that trends in student outcomes at treated and control schools would not be systematically different in the absence of treatment.
Under this identifying assumption, I estimate the effect of the introduction of automatic promotion on test scores of fourth graders by the following regression model:
( 1) where Y ist is the test score for individual i in school s at time t, d s is a school dummy which captures school-specific time invariant effects, d t is a time dummy which captures the common time trend of control and treatment group, d st is the time/treatment-status interaction term containing information on the treatment status of schools, that varies over time. γ in equation (1) is the coefficient of interest and reflects the average treatment effect of the introduction of automatic promotion on test scores of fourth graders. Z it is a set of covariates controlling for individual characteristics. X st denotes a set of exogenous covariates for class and school characteristics, including average socioeconomic characteristics of students, detailed school characteristics, 14 the participation in federal, state and municipal educational programmes, 15 14 Specifically, the covariates include initial (first grade) enrolment, number of teachers at school, number of total staff (besides teaching staff), dummy variables describing the type of the premises used for the school, dummies for the availability and number of teaching material (e.g. overhead projectors, personal computers, TV and video sets etc.), the availability of computer and science labs, school kitchen, the quality of sanitary units, number of class rooms in-and outside the school and dummies for whether the school provides all 8 years of primary education.
teacher characteristics and other. 16 ε is a stochastic error term. Although non-random assignment of schools to treatment may lead to a correlation between assignment status and outcomes, this does not violate the common trend assumption as long as any differences that lead to the adoption of the policy are captured by the school-fixed effects. The common trend assumption may nevertheless be violated if selection into treatment was based on pre-treatment trends in school characteristics that differ between treatment and control. If, for example, schools with high performing students and low repetition rates adopt automatic promotion test scores and treatment status are correlated for reasons other than the treatment impact of automatic promotion. Unfortunately I do not have pre-treatment test score data to test directly for the common trend assumption. I nevertheless can investigate whether selection into treatment is based on pre-treatment differences in repetition rates. Table A2 reveals that pre-intervention repetition rates (from the 1997 school census before automatic promotion was introduced at any school) were virtually identical across treatment and control schools, so that there is little concern for self-selection of schools into treatment based on high or low repetition rates. As I have pointed out earlier, the first wave of the policy adoption was initiated on the SRE level, which furthermore limits the potential for individual schools to select into treatment based on trends in test scores. The second wave was then determined by the decision of the CEE made for all remaining schools, so that there is virtually no scope for selection on a pre-treatment trend basis.
As the treatment regressor varies at the school level and test scores of students in the same school are likely correlated, for example because they share the same learning environment and/or are from the same neighbourhood, conventional standard errors may be misleading as they do not account for the grouped error structure. The robust standard errors reported therefore allow for clustering on the school level (Donald and Lang 2007) .
ESTIMATION RESULTS

Main results
The basic idea of the DiD strategy can be illustrated by a simple 2-by-2 table. Table 1 shows the levels and differences in test scores between treatment and control groups and the changes over time. The first row reports means before treatment (year=2003), when control schools were already under the automatic promotion regime and the treatment schools were still under the annual grade retention regime and the mean difference for the two groups. The entries in the first column reveal that schools that had already adopted automatic promotion have a mean score that is 7.05% of a standard deviation lower than schools that had not yet adopted This simple double difference can be amended in a regression framework following equation (1) to improve precision of the estimates and to be able to control for covariates and check the sensitivity of the estimates to their inclusion. that the regime change from annual grade retention to automatic promotion has a significant negative impact on educational attainment on fourth graders in state schools in Minas Gerais. In the next section I will discuss the interpretation of the results.
6.2 Interpretation of the results and the disincentive of automatic promotion If the estimated effect is caused by a change in study incentives to avoid being retained, one would expect heterogeneous treatment effects along the test score distribution. Students in the lower tail of the distribution should be more heavily impacted by removing this incentive when compared to students in the upper tail, as these students should be less concerned about the possibility of retention. For that purpose I estimate equation (1) Table 4 provides the quantile DiD estimates and reveals substantial differences in the treatment effect across the nine quantiles. The estimates range between -9.01 and -3.92 and are more pronounced in the lower half of the distribution, with the strongest effects centred on the fourth quantile. The effect of automatic promotion is much smaller for the top two quantiles and not statistically significant, yet still negative and nonnegligible in magnitude. The inverse u-shaped distribution of effects is consistent with the interpretation of the estimates as disincentive effect of automatic grade promotion, such that the treatment effect is largest for students left of the centre of the distribution close to the assumed grade promotion threshold and smaller for high performing students that are unlikely to be retained. Similarly, for students at the very bottom of the distribution the effects are somewhat smaller with a coefficient of -7.49 but still above the mean treatment effect. The slightly smaller effect at the bottom of the distribution could be explained by either a different perception of the cost associated with retention or the fact that grade retention is a possibility for these low performing students regardless of their effort. 19 There is some suggestive evidence that automatic promotion indeed directly impacts the behaviour of students and reduced their study effort. Column (1) of For the interpretation of the estimates as disincentive effect, any possible channel of effect of automatic promotion on outcomes -other than the disincentive effect -has to be precluded.
Most importantly, potential changes in the composition of students in treatment and control schools over time could systematically lower test scores rather than the changes in incentives reducing the effort of students. Because there is grade retention in control and treatment schools in both periods at the end of third grade this leads to a positive selection of the students entering into fourth grade in both treatment and control schools and this mechanically limits the potential for changes in the student composition. In the section 6.4 I will discuss the implications of this in detail. 20 All of the outcome variables in table A3 are based on pupil reported behavioural responses of themselves, their parents and their teachers and should therefore be considered more cautiously. 21 Teachers may equally worry about the lost incentive for students and target their effort on the most affected students, so that a potential teacher response may go either way. 22 Section 6.8 looks separately at class size as another teaching input. Only the coefficients on the mean number of fridges per household and on mean age are statistically significant. All other indicators of the socio-economic composition are not affected by the introduction of automatic promotion, which is very reassuring. While the coefficient for the mean number of fridges per household is very small and may be due to some spurious correlation, the significant reduction in mean age by about one month is more relevant and it is important to understand the source of this reduction in age and its consequence for the interpretation of the result. Table 8 , column 2 shows the DiD estimate of the policy change on the net inflow of students from first to fourth grade and from first to third grade in column (1).
Whereas the coefficient in column (1) is very small, negative and not statistically significant, the coefficient for the net inflow of students including the inflow of repeaters from the previous year at the beginning of fourth grade is sizeable, positive and very precisely estimated (column (2)).
Looking at the direct effect of the inflow of repeaters on mean age of the cohort reveals that this almost exactly explains the age effect estimated in (2) and (3) leads to a very similar increase of 20% of the effect to -7.33% and -6.77%, respectively.
An alternative way of investigating the importance of the bias for all specifications is to restrict the estimations to students that have never repeated by excluding all students outside the target age range of fourth graders. Once students from the additional inflow at fourth grade from the sample are removed, this leaves a sample of students that have never repeated. 26 Chart A of table 5 reports the results for the same specifications as in table 2, but restricts the sample to students in the target age range for fourth graders. By restricting the sample in this way the coefficients exceed the estimates of the original full sample in all specifications by around 30%.
The estimated effect is a further 11-16% larger compared to the estimates in chart B of table 2.
Restricting the sample to repeaters (chart B, table 5) reveals a negative effect that is considerably smaller and no longer statistically significant. The number of excluded students is nevertheless larger than what could be explained by excluding fourth grade repeaters only, as removing overage students from the sample also removes students that have repeated at third grade. As repetition is equally possible in all schools at third grade, the additional increase in the estimates is therefore not necessarily related to treatment. The increase rather suggests that the incentive of grade retention may have a different impact on previous repeaters compared to students that have never repeated a grade. The cost of repetition is likely highest for students that have not previously repeated. In contrast the cost of being retained again is smaller for previous repeaters, as they may already have suffered stigmatization and have already been separated from their original peer group. The difference in results for the restricted sample therefore may not only reflect the correction for the differential inflow of repeaters at fourth grade, but may also more generally reflect heterogeneous effects on repeaters and non-repeaters.
A more comprehensive analysis of the sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of age controls is provided in table A4 in the annex. I present different specifications of equation (1) with and without controlling for individual age for the full sample (chart A) and the age restricted sample in chart B. The results support the previous findings. Adding individual age as control (columns 4, 6 and 8) strengthens the negative effect in the full and restricted sample for all the different specifications.
Besides the direct effect on the composition, there may be an indirect effect on students of having repeaters in the class room. Repeaters may impose a negative externality on their peers because their achievement is lower or because they may be more disruptive in class (Lazear 2001 and not significant at conventional levels.
Effect of the policy change on drop-out rates
The effect of retention on student drop-out has been studied elsewhere in the literature (see Jacob and Lefgren 2004 , 2009 , Manacorda 2012 . If the introduction of automatic promotion has an effect on drop-out rates in grades prior to fourth grade, this may change unobserved student characteristics that cannot be controlled for. I estimate the effect of the introduction of automatic promotion on drop-out rates in a DiD specification similar to equation (1) as (2), using aggregated data from the school census. Column (2) of table 4 reports the coefficients for each grade. Drop-out rates in second grade are unaffected by the policy change. 27 The treatment nevertheless has a small effect on drop-out rates at third grade, by reducing the rate by half a percent. This is equivalent to a mean reduction of 0.31 students per school/cohort and presumably negligible in its potential impact on mean test scores.
6.6 Effect of the policy change on school transfer rates Another potential source for compositional changes is related to student mobility between schools. Parents that expect a negative effect of automatic promotion on their children may for instance want to move their children to a school with grade retention. In Minas Gerais the possibility for switching public schools is limited as enrolment is mainly based on residence and a single public school often serves the local neighbourhood. Given very substantial fees at private schools it is also unlikely that parents move their children into private schools to avoid a specific grade promotion regime. As the policy was introduced while the cohort of interest was in second grade the incentive for parents to move their children is further reduced. To test for any effect of the policy change on between-school mobility I estimate the effect of the introduction of automatic promotion on student transfer rates using the same framework as in the previous section. Columns (3) and (4) of table 4 report point estimates for outgoing and incoming transfer rates that are close to zero and not significant for any grades, so that there is no evidence that student mobility has an impact on the student composition.
Systematic test taking behaviour
Although participation in PROEB is mandatory on the school and individual level, some students fail to attend the test. 28 If the propensity to show up at the exam is related to the capacity of the student and to the treatment status of the school, this may bias the estimates. This might be induced by strategic behaviour of school administrators or teachers trying to manipulate the mean test scores of their school in the PROEB exam. If this is systematically linked to treatment status this could bias the estimates. Notably, individually identified test results are not available to the schools and PROEB test scores are not used by schools for the grade promotion decisions. I use information from the official student numbers in each school from the school census and compare these to the number of students participating in PROEB. I estimate equation (2) using the difference between the two figures as outcome variable. Table 7 27 First grade repetition rates are also unaffected as predicted, because the policy change only takes effect after first grade. This is a relevant observation as it shows that there are no anticipatory effects from schools to the introduction to the policy change. 28 The participation rate for the 2003 and 2006 wave of PROEB is around 95% as participation is strictly enforced and absence is only permitted in case of illness.
presents the results from the regression. The coefficient is very small (0.119 students) and not statistically significant so that there is no evidence for systematic absence of students from the test.
Effect of the policy change on class size
There may be other teaching inputs that could be affected by the policy change; for example a reduction in retention rates may affect class-size, which in turn may have an impact on outcomes. There is a comprehensive literature on the effect of class size on student performance but the overall picture about class-size effects remains rather unclear. 29 To rule out that the estimates are biased by an effect of the policy on class-size I test for changes in class-size for each grade induced by the policy change for the cohorts of interest and column (5) of table 4 reports the DiD results. There is no evidence for an effect of the policy change on class-size in any grade, so that estimates on test scores are unlikely biased by treatment induced class-size effects. Even under the assumption that the introduction of automatic promotion releases other school resources that could be allocated to fourth grade students (for which there is no evidence in the present analysis) this would lead to underestimating the true impact of the disincentive created by automatic promotion.
The fact that none of the above estimates (for repetition rates, drop-out rates, class-size, transfer rates) reveal any significant effect for first grade estimates is in itself an important falsification exercise. All these estimates are based on a pseudo-treatment as the first grade of the 2006 exam cohort was not yet affected by the policy introduction. This also indicates that there are no anticipatory effects of the schools in respect to the imminent introduction of automatic promotion that may affect student outcomes at a later stage.
CONCLUSIONS
Existing empirical work on grade retention has to date focused on analysing the direct effect of retention on repeaters. The focus on the ex-post effects may nevertheless neglect an important effect of the grade retention regime that work through incentives to study on a larger range of students than repeaters only. The introduction of automatic promotion removes the incentives linked to the threat of retention and in this paper I use exogenous variation in the timing of the policy adoption in public primary schools in the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais to obtain causal estimates of automatic promotion.
29 See Hoxby (2000) and Angrist & Lavy (1999) for two prominent studies on class size effects.
Using a DiD approach I find a negative effect of about 6,7% of a standard deviation, significant at the 1% level. Controlling for individual age strengthens the negative effect by about 20%, which gives an idea about the size of the bias associated with the differential inflow of repeaters into fourth grade before and after treatment. The estimated effect of the introduction of automatic promotion is of non-negligible size. Considering that automatic promotion may have a negative effect in several grades, the overall impact of the automatic promotion regime may lead to considerable loss of academic achievement over the eight years of primary school.
Quantile DiD estimates yield an interesting insight into the distribution of effects. The quantile DiD estimates reveal that a large set of students is impacted by the policy change and not only the least performing students. The inverse u-shape of effects along the test score distribution is consistent with an interpretation of the estimates as disincentive effect of automatic promotion.
Some further suggestive evidence on student responses support this interpretation. Other potential channels, in particular related to changes in the student composition, can be ruled out. Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** denotes significance at 5%. The coefficients report the effect of introducing automatic promotion on the dependent variables for 1 st to 4 th grade using data from the school census 2000-2006 following the theoretical test cohorts. For each grade a separate regression has been fitted estimating the effect corresponding to equation (1) Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** significance at 5%, * significance at 10%. The coefficients report the quantile differences-in-difference treatment effects for nine quantiles of the test score distribution. The regressions include year dummies and school fixed effects. Bootstrapped standard errors (200 repetitions) adjusted for clustering on the school level are reported in parenthesis.
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%. The above samples exclude students that are below the target age range. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within schools, are reported in parenthesis. Specification (1) only includes year dummies and school fixed effects, specification (2) additionally controls for a rich set of school characteristics (physical characteristics of the school and the class rooms, teaching material, teacher characteristics, participation in educational programmes etc.), specification (3) additionally controls for peer socio-economic characteristics at the school level and specification (4) also controls for individual characteristics. Notes: denotes ** significance at 5% level, *** significance at 1% level. All estimates refer to school means or proportions at the school level. All data is taken from the socioeconomic questionnaire of PROEB. For each dependent variable the effect is estimated separately in a regression corresponding to equation (1) as . The regression estimates are weighted by school cohort size and include a year dummies (d t ) and school fixed effects (d s ). Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within SREs, are reported in parenthesis. All estimates are weighted by school cohort size. Notes: The coefficient reports the effect of the introduction of automatic promotion on the difference of the number of students according to the school census and the PROEB test. The effect is estimated by a regression corresponding to equation (1) 630 (52.326) 69.245 (50.132) 0.197 0.047 38.276 (30.966) 41.202 (32.187) Notes: The binary variables of school characteristics and programme participation are coded 0 for not present (no participation) and 1 for present (participation). All data is from the Brazilian school census 2003 and 2006. The p-value is reported from a test on the equality of the mean between the treatment and control groups (independent samples). As the sample size is sufficiently large the result for using a classical t-test or taking into account the binary values and the underlying binomial distribution deliver very similar results. As the group size and with it the variances between the groups differ, approximate t using individual sample variances instead of the pooled variance and Welch's approximation of the degrees of freedom have been used. The normalized difference is computed as The p-value is reported from a test on the equality of the mean between the treatment and control groups (independent samples). As the sample size is sufficiently large the result for using a classical t-test or taking into account the binary values and the underlying binomial distribution deliver very similar results. As the group size and with it the variances between the groups differ, approximate t using individual sample variances instead of the pooled variance and Welch's approximation of the degrees of freedom have been used. The normalized difference is computed as
, where S 2 denotes the sample variance of X i . Notes: All data is from the Brazilian school census 1997. The p-value is reported from a test on the equality of the mean between the treatment and control groups (independent samples). As the sample size is sufficiently large the result for using a classical t-test or alternatively taking into account the binary values and the underlying binomial distribution deliver very similar results. As the group size and with it the variances between the groups differ, approximate t using individual sample variances instead of the pooled variance and Welch's approximation of the degrees of freedom have been used. Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, * denotes significance at 10%. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering within schools are reported in parenthesis. The coefficients report the effect of the introduction of automatic promotion behavioural responses of students, parents and teachers. The effects are estimated by a regression corresponding to equation (1) as . The binary outcome variables were constructed using consistent information from the socio-economic questionnaire of PROEB 2003 and 2006. The dependent variable in column(1) reports change in fraction of students always doing their homework (mean 0.706), in column (2) the change in fraction of students always receiving help from their parents with their homework (mean 0.652), in column (3) the change in fraction of teachers assigning homework (mean 0.981), and in column (4) the change in fraction of teachers always correcting homework of their students (mean 0.767). Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%. All estimates include controls for school characteristics (physical characteristics of the school and the class rooms, teaching material, teacher characteristics, participation in educational programmes etc.) The specifications (1) include additionally controls for peer socio-economic characteristics, specifications (2) control for per and individual characteristics, specifications (3) control for individual characteristics. The row below specifies further controls for individual and peer age in the estimation. Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, standard errors are in parenthesis. Specification (2) includes regional school administration dummies (SRE). Most of the physical characteristics describing the schools are indicator variables on the presence at school. Similarly, indicator variables inform about participation in education programmes. The programme Parameters in Action is a federal programme for the professional development of teachers; FNDE denotes a maintenance and development programme for education by the National Fund for the Development of Education, Ouvebem is a national campaign for the importance of the sense of hearing, Reabvis is a national campaign on visual rehabilitation, PROINFO is a federal computer literacy programme. The coefficients reported are from two specifications of a linear model of the effect of school characteristics on the probability for treatment. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero for being in treatment group and equals 1 for being in the control group. In specification (1) only very few coefficients are significant at the 1% and 5% level of significance, of which some disappear when including regional dummies (specification (2). None of the coefficients of the linear model produces values outside the unit-interval and a logit specification delivers very similar results to the linear specification diminishing doubts on the suitability of the linear specification (not reported).
